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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy copy

SUBJECT: Current Situation in Lebanon: Background for NSPG Meeting (U) —
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(S) The most important issues for Defense now related to Lebanon are:

- USMC-IDF incidents
- Status of negotiations
- MNF and its future expansion
- Lebanese Armed Forces Modernization Program (LAMP)
- Continued U.S. security role in Lebanon
- This paper only addresses the two most important of these issues at this time: the incidents and the status of negotiations.

(S) NEGOTIATIONS:

- For the past week there have been a series of high level meetings on major Lebanon issues which Fred Ikle alone has attended. You may wish to get a briefing from Fred on these meetings.
- We understand that JCS has been asked to prepare force requirements for a heavy US participation (perhaps up to a division) in southern Lebanon to ensure Israeli security and remove any arguments for its continued presence. This could be an alternative, which we could offer the Israelis, to our present thinking of a maximum participation of two battalions in an expanded MNF. We do not have this JCS paper. You may wish to discuss this with LTC Gorman before the meeting.
- We understand additionally that Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Habib favor a return by Habib to the area to attempt, once more, to work out negotiating differences between Lebanon and Israel. Moreover, we have been told that Habib may wish, in this next stage, to work out with Lebanon a negotiating position which would involve some normalization with Israel, for which he would then seek the support of moderate Arabs.
- A detailed discussion and copies of key cable traffic related to the negotiations is at Tab A.

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USMC-IDF INCIDENTS: (A complete review of the incidents is at Tab B.)

- There cannot be any doubt that the recent series of incidents between the USMC and the IDF were deliberate provocations.
- We believe the Israelis want to:
 - Discredit the MNF, as they did with UNIFIL;
 - Make it more difficult to obtain Congressional support for American participation in an expanded MNF;
 - Challenge the US in order to draw our focus away from broader negotiations on Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Middle East in general;
 - Force direct military contacts which would tend to undercut diplomatic channels set up to handle peacekeeping questions.
- We are convinced that, in general, the State Department and our own public affairs approach to these incidents has been weak and that we may be losing this public affairs battle. We are extremely concerned with the misrepresentations of US actions, intentions, and motivations appearing in the Israeli public affairs statements.
- We seem to have reached general agreement in Beirut yesterday over the demarcation line between the Marines and the IDF. (At Tab C is the reporting cable detailing this agreement.) This may not, however, mean that there will be a halt to the incidents, due to the reasons for them stated above.
- We would not be surprised if there were incidents with the other MNF members (French, Italians, and British) in the near future.

Attachments
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FRANCIS J. WEST, JR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

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SUBJECT: Status of the Lebanon Negotiations

(S) Three simultaneous channels of negotiation are operating:

- "Secret Israeli-Lebanese discussions" that produced the Sharon document that has been the basis for the Draper talks
- The Draper talks (trilateral between the US, Israel, and Lebanon)
- Habib mission: Direct US-Israeli talks that are designed to "cook" a US-Israeli deal for which the US will obtain Lebanese agreement. Once this has been obtained, detailed talks will return to the Draper arena.

(S) Four proposals are presently tabled that serve as the outline for various negotiating positions or as devices to channel discussions:

- The Sharon Document (copy unavailable)
- An unofficial Lebanese counterdraft to the Sharon Document (Tab A)
- Israeli Draft Agreement (Tab B)
- US proposal attempting to bridge Lebanese-Israeli differences (Tab C)

(S) Habib has characterized the Israeli Draft Agreement as "completely unworkable". It is a virtual peace treaty and requires more normalization than the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. He sees substantial problems on four issues:

- Israeli-manned warning stations in southern Lebanon.
- Immediate steps in normalization.
- Requirement for total PLO withdrawal before any Israeli withdrawal.
- An international presence in the security zone.

(S) The unofficial Lebanese document is an attempt to detail those areas where the Lebanese agree with the Sharon document.

- It is evident that the Israelis are intent on securing maximum political gains in the Lebanon negotiations in return for a troop withdrawal.
- The Israelis have little interest in rapid progress, since an agreement in Lebanon would allow the US to shift its focus to the larger peace negotiations.
- In this connection, you may recall that MG Sagi told you recently that there should not be an early withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon because, from the Israeli view, Syria would become further isolated and more militant.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

SUBJECT: USMC-IDF Incidents

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There have been six incidents involving Israeli Defense Forces attempting to cross through US Marine checkpoints bordering the Multinational Force's area of operations:

1. ~~(S)~~ On 5 January, at 1410-1421 hours, two IDF tanks and one IDF Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) drove through the Beirut International Airport fence at the perimeter of the US Marines' area of operations and drove southward on the perimeter road. The vehicles were stopped by USMC personnel. The senior IDF officer stated he had been lost when he came through the fence, and the Marines escorted the IDF vehicles from the area.
2. ~~(S)~~ On 6 January, at 1200-1235 hours, two IDF jeeps and an IDF van approached the area of the 5 January penetration, and stopped at a checkpoint manned by the USMC and the Lebanese Armed Forces. An Israeli officer stated that he intended to use the perimeter road, but subsequently departed at the request of a Marine officer. The IDF officer stated that his commander would return the next day to see the US Marine commander. The IDF commander did not appear.
3. ~~(S)~~ On 8 January, at 1007-1033 hours, two IDF jeeps and one IDF APC approached a USMC checkpoint. One of the IDF officers present (a LTC) had also been present at the 5 January incident. An unidentified IDF individual (wearing no rank insignia) asked to speak with the USMC battalion commander. The IDF individual was told that any request to meet the USMC commander must be made through Embassy channels. The IDF personnel departed. Approximately one hour later, two IDF tanks and 15 men moved off the Sidon road toward the Marine checkpoint but halted before reaching the USMC position.
4. ~~(S)~~ On 10 January, at 1625 hours, IDF personnel began searching an area to the east of USMC positions for an individual who had been shot and wounded by IDF forces while apparently bird hunting within a hunting area. After the wounded individual departed the area in his car, IDF personnel approached a USMC/LAF checkpoint and requested entry, claiming that the wounded individual had fled through the USMC position. Permission was denied to the IDF personnel and the patrol departed. At 1705 hours, IDF personnel returned to the USMC/LAF checkpoint and deployed crew-served automatic weapons and personnel adjacent to the checkpoint. Again the

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IDF forces requested entry to the Marines' area. During the ensuing discussion, IDF personnel loaded their weapons and trained the crew-served weapons on USMC personnel. Once again, entry was denied to the IDF forces, and the patrol departed.

5. (S) On 17 January, at 1715 hours, an Israeli patrol attempted to cross a USMC checkpoint and enter the Multinational Force area of operations to gain access to a village near the Beirut Airport. The IDF request for entry was refused and the patrol departed. Shortly afterward, the Israelis returned and requested entry a second time. During this encounter, a US Marine sentry was "nudged" by an Israeli jeep, but without injury. Once again, access to the Multinational Force area was denied to the IDF personnel, and they departed.
6. (S) On 2 February, at 0900 hours, 3 IDF tanks were travelling northward on a trail directly toward the USMC Company Headquarters at the Lebanese University Library (the area of two previous incidents). At a point approximately 300 meters short of the Marine headquarters, the USMC company commander (a USMC Captain) halted the IDF tanks, and the lead Israeli tank stopped within a foot of him. The USMC Captain requested to speak with the senior IDF officer, who, after five minutes, dismounted the lead tank. The USMC Captain stated that the IDF tanks could not proceed. The IDF officer (tentatively identified as the same LTC who had been present at two previous incidents) stated he would proceed through the US area to the railroad tracks, and stated he wanted to speak with the USMC "General". The USMC Captain again stated that the IDF tanks could not pass through. The Israeli officer stated that the IDF tanks were going to pass through anyway, and began to mount his tank. At this point, the Marine Captain pulled and loaded his weapon, and stated that the Israeli tanks would have to go through him to pass. The lead IDF tank turned west, and when it had proceeded several meters the other two IDF tanks began to move forward toward US positions. The USMC Captain then mounted the first IDF tank with his weapon drawn and told the Israeli senior officer to stop his tanks. The IDF LtCol then spoke on the radio, stopped his tanks, and spoke with his higher authority. At approximately 0950 the Israeli tanks departed southward to the Sidon Road.

(U) The US Government has repeatedly expressed its concern about these incidents to the Government of Israel. We note that the Israeli Defense Ministry last week had ordered Israeli forces to refrain from approaching US positions. It was our understanding, following Ambassador Draper's meeting with Major General Drori on 28 January, that Israeli forces would make no further approaches to Marine positions. These positions have been in place since the

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Marines' deployment in September 1982, and are well known. On 24 January, we provided the IDF with a map showing precise locations of all USMC positions, checkpoints and observation posts. The IDF is also fully cognizant of the orders under which US forces are operating at these checkpoints.

(U) Channels exist for communication between the IDF and the Marines: through the Government of Lebanon, the MNF Military Coordinating Committee and US-Israeli diplomatic missions. In the event of an incident arising through misunderstanding or other unforeseeable circumstances, there is an emergency communications system enabling the Multinational Forces and the Lebanese Army to communicate with Israeli forces.

(U) We have carefully examined the security situation in and around the US Marine area of operations, and have concluded that the Marine area is secure, and that the Marines are carrying out their mission of support for the Lebanese Government. We find no basis whatsoever for the statements by responsible Israeli officials that the US Marines are serving as a "buffer" for Palestinian guerrillas.

(U) We regret any loss of life through further hostilities in Lebanon. Based upon our examination of the available facts, the perpetrators of recently-alleged attacks against the IDF cannot be reliably identified, nor can the routes of attack and escape be determined. We do know, however, that none of these attacks was in the immediate vicinity of the Marine area of operations.

(U) The mission of the US Marine contingent of the Multinational Force is to assist the Government of Lebanon in its efforts to regain national sovereignty and independence. The Marines have been directed to assist the Lebanese Army in its mission of prohibiting movement through their lines of armed personnel other than members of the Multinational Force or the Lebanese Army. Only in the event of a hostile threat to the MNF or to co-located Lebanese Army personnel would the use of force be considered by US troops. The Marines have performed this task to the letter, with great discipline and tact. Americans can take great pride in the contribution of the US Marines to the stability and independence of Lebanon, and in the high standard of professional conduct they have shown in carrying out their duties.

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